I discuss Steinhart's argument against Benacerraf's famous multiple reductions argument to the effect that numbers cannot be sets. Steinhart offers a mathematical argument according to which there is only one series of sets to which the natural numbers can be reduced (namely, the finite von Neumann ordinals), and thus attacks Benacerraf's assumption that there are multiple reductions of numbers to sets. I will argue that Steinhart's argument is problematic and should not be accepted.
Introduction
In his (1965) paper, Paul Benacerraf famously put forward an argument against metaphysical reduction of numbers to sets: since there are multiple ways (all equally good) to reduce numbers to sets, it is not the case that numbers are sets. Although it is disputable whether Benacerraf meant to use this argument to support any version of structuralism (see Benacerraf 1998) , this argument is typically considered as one of the main motivations to move towards a structuralist conception of numbers (see for example Parsons 1990 , Resnik 1997 , Shapiro 1997 ).
There have been several attempts to reject Benacerraf's conclusion that numbers cannot be sets (see for example Wetzel 1988 , Paseau 2009 ), but -as far 1 as I know -there has been only one attempt to challenge the premise of Benacerraf's argument according to which there are multiple series of sets which numbers can be reduced to. In his (2002) paper, Eric Steinhart claims to have a "detailed mathematical demonstration that 0 is { } and for every natural number n, n is the set of all natural numbers less than n", which implies that "Natural numbers are sets. They are the finite von Neumann ordinals" (p. 343). Even more, he claims to have a "mathematical demonstration that if α is any progression that satisfies Benacerraf's conditions, then α is the finite von Neumann ordinals" (Steinhart 2002, p. 343 ; italics in the original).
Such a proof -if valid -would be of the utmost importance, for two reasons. First of all, it is supposed to be a mathematical proof, and Steinhart rightly underlines this point. It would show that any reduction different from the finite von Neumann ordinals generates a contradiction. If true, this would be quite an important mathematical result -to say the least. Secondly, if this proof is right, it would pull the rug out from under the structuralist approach to mathematics. Although it is not the only one, Benacerraf's multiple reductions argument is one of the main motivations for mathematical structuralism.
All this considered, it is remarkable that Steinhart's proof received so little attention in the literature on the topic. His paper is cited mainly as an example of 'hardcore' reductionism, and as such it is usually presented as one of the many possible positions in philosophy of mathematics.
1 It should be noted, however, that Steinhart does not intend to suggest his argument as an alternative (maybe more reliable) to other reductionist or anti-reductionist views. Once again, we should stress that the proof is mathematical. As such, it is meant to rule out any other way to reduce numbers to sets (or anything else).
In the present paper, I will discuss Steinhart's (2002) proof. First I will briefly present Benacerraf's argument (sec. 2), and then I will introduce Steinhart's argument (sec. 3). Finally, I will argue against Steinhart's conclusion that the only possible reduction of numbers to sets is to the finite von Neumann 
Benacerraf's argument
Let me first quickly summarize Benacerraf's argument, so that we can fix a reference frame for later discussions. For our purposes, we can summarize it in the following way:
(a) Suppose some set-theoretic reduction of the natural numbers is correct.
(b) If at least one set-theoretic reduction of the natural numbers is correct, then exactly one is.
(c) The necessary and sufficient conditions for a series of set to be a correct reduction are: This argument (or more complex reconstructions of this argument) has been variously criticised across decades. An analysis of these criticisms would exceed the limits and the scopes of the present paper. For our aims, it will suffice to underline that, among premises (a)-(e), the most promising lines of attack seem to concern premises (b) and (d). Either (i) we deny that multiple reductions are incompatible with reductionism; or (ii) we deny that multiple reductions are indeed a possibility.
The first option (i) has been pursued, for example, by Paseau (2009) . The second option (ii) can be pursued in at least two possible ways: either (iia) 3 through some (extreme) version of mathematical naturalism, or (iib) through a real confutation of the very possibility of multiple reductions. The former strategy (iia) relies on the simple consideration that mathematicians (mainly number theoreticians and set-theoreticians), in their working day practice, take natural numbers to be finite von Neumann ordinals. As we will see (sec. 3), they make this choice for various practical and general reasons. By assuming a strong version of naturalism, according to which mathematical and philosophical issues should be settled by mathematicians' own methodological standard, one might argue that, since mathematicians only adopt a specific reduction, this specific reduction is the only one philosophers should accept. Such a version of naturalism is quite strong, however, and not all supporters of naturalism might agree with it. show that it is not valid.
Steinhart's argument
Let us choose any progression of objects to serve as our natural numbers -let us call it α.
3 This α will contain the set of our α-numbers ω = {α 0 , α 1 , α 2 , . . .}, a successor function f , a zero object e, and a less-than relation ≺. Therefore, we have α = (ω, f, e, ≺).
Since α = NN, α must satisfy both the arithmetic and cardinality conditions. Following Benacerraf, Steinhart takes these conditions to be both sufficient and necessary to identify the NN. The cardinality condition consists, according to Steinhart, of two metaphysically relevant parts: an existential rule (C1), and a definition (C2):
(C1) for any x, if x ∈ ω then there exists a set x * = {z ∈ ω|z < x} (i.e.,
for every x, there exists the set of all its predecessors);
(C2) the cardinality of a set S is x iff there exists a 1-1 correspondence between S and x * .
If α is NN, it is because it satisfies the NN conditions; but if α satisfies NN conditions, then (from C1) we must conclude that, for any x there is an x * . Let us call ω * = {x * |x ∈ ω} the set of all the x * . We can see that the cardinality condition (C1) defines a function Q from ω to ω * : for any x ∈ ω, Q(x) = x * .
In turn, the cardinality definition (C2) defines another function C from S onto ω: for any countable set S, C(S) = x iff there is a 1-1 function from S onto x * . Since the domain of the function C includes all the countable sets in the NN-universe, it follows that C(x * ) = x. Let K be the restriction of C to the NN-universe. We can now define a new function f * by simply composing these functions. Let f * be the composition
x; f maps x onto (x + 1); and Q maps (x + 1) onto (x + 1) * . Therefore
* , and f * defines a successor function over ω * . Q obviously maps 0 onto 0 * , thus 0 * = e * . Eventually, we define ≺ * as follows:
Every component of α * has been introduced only by means of elements, functions, and relations that were already available in α. Since α is in the NNuniverse, then e, f , ≺, Q, and K are in the NN-universe as well, and so must be ω * , e * , f * , and ≺ * . For, according to Steinhart,
If the NN-conditions assert some rule R, then the NN-universe contains the domain of R, the range of R, the extension of R, and 5 nothing else. For if we cannot reason to the existence of those objects in the NN-universe, then that rule is meaningless (it plays no role in determining the models of the NN-conditions) (Steinhart 2002, p. 353 ).
I will say something more on this specific assumption by Steinhart (see section 4.1). The point Steinhart is stressing here is that, if the NN-conditions assert some rule (for example C1), that's because this rule is supposed to be metaphysically relevant and necessary to identify what natural numbers are;
and if this rule is metaphysically necessary, then -according to Steinhart - all the set-theoretic components of this rule (domain, range, extension) must be in the NN-universe.
Since ω is in the NN-universe (by definition), then ω * and 0 * are in the NN-universe as well. Since f , Q, and K, are in the NN-universe, then their composition f * must be in the NN-universe as well. Since ≺ and K are in the NN-universe, then their composition ≺ * must be in the NN-universe as well. In sum, α * must be in the NN-universe -which in turn, according to Steinhart, implies that α * satisfies the NN-conditions.
We can see where all this is going: (1) if α = N , then α satisfies the NN-conditions; (2) if α satisfies the NN-conditions, then α * satisfies the NNconditions; (3) if α * satisfies the NN-conditions, then α * = N ; therefore (4)
Clearly, if α = α * , then they must be the FVNO.
Quod erat demonstrandum -we can conclude. Right?
Objections
Not so quick. There seems to be nothing wrong with the logic of the argument but, in my view, it relies on some (hidden) assumptions which are problematic.
The aims of this section is to spell out these assumptions in details, evaluate their relevance for the proof, and discuss whether we should accept them or not.
In the first subsection (4.1), I will analyze the notion of "NN-universe" as it is employed by Steinhart. As it will turn out, this notion is neither innocent, nor easily justifiable. In the second subsection (4.2), I will put under scrutiny the notion of "identity" as it is used by Steinhart in statements like "α = N ".
Interpretative issues will be raised about this notion, which, again, will make room for different objections. In subsection 4.3, I will offer a possible interpretation for the notion of "identity" which might overcome the difficulties raised in subsection 4.2. However, I will show that this interpretation does weaken the proof to a considerable degree, mainly by overloading the role played by the cardinality condition.
Reductions and universes
Steinhart's proof crucially depends on the notion of "NN-universe". In particular, according to Steinhart, if ω is in the NN-universe, then ω * is in the NN-universe as well. Since ω * is in the NN-universe, and since we can define f * , e * , and ≺ * accordingly, then α * is in the NN-universe and satisfies the NN-conditions.
This allows him to conclude that α = α * , which can only happen if α = FVNO.
A key step in the proof is that ω * must be included in the NN-universe. In this section I will argue that such a step is not justified; i.e., I do not see reasons enough to include ω * in our NN-universe. If ω * should not be included in the NN-universe, then the proof is undermined.
Steinhart's reasons to include ω * in the NN-universe are twofold. One one hand, he claims (A) that the NN-conditions are metaphysically relevant to spell out models of the NN-universe; on the other hand, he claims that (B) if the NNconditions assert some (metaphysically relevant) rule R, the NN-universe must contain not only the domain of R, but also the range and the extension of R. 4 Let us call the latter claim (B) the NN-Universe Assumption (NNUA henceforth).
Both these reasons are somehow linked to the notion of NN-universe. However, Steinhart's usage of the notion of NN-universe is quite obscure to me.
In mathematical jargon a universe is, loosely put, a collection that contains 4 Cfr. p. 353.
all the entities we want to consider within a specific theory, and which we will allow our first order quantifiers to range over in that specific theory. 5 In the case of arithmetic, I interpret the notion of "NN-universe" as meaning that the entities we are talking about will simply be the natural numbers. However, in this specific context we are trying to offer a reduction of natural numbers to sets. This means that our goal will consist in showing that the universe of arithmetic (the NN-universe) and a specific subset of the set-theoretic universe are indeed the same thing. In other words, we aim to identify (in a reductionistic perspective) the NN-universe with ω. All the functions (for example f , Q, and K) we will consider next, will have ω as their domain; analogously, all the n-adic relations (for example ≺) we will consider next, will be a subset of the cartesian
Such a conception of a "NN-universe" -which corresponds to standard mathematical usage of this notion -certainly allows us to form sets of numbers.
For example, we can form the set of odd numbers, the set of even numbers, the set of prime numbers, and so on. We can certainly discuss properties of these sets, and this is a relevant part of our theory. However, the creation of these sets of numbers does not modify in any sense the extension of the NN-universe, since these sets are just subsets of the original NN-universe. In other words, in considering the set of even numbers and its properties, we do not need to include this set as a different element of the NN-universe (i.e., we do not extend our NN-universe to include all the natural numbers plus the set of even numbers, the set of odd numbers, the set of prime numbers, and so on). We can even form sets of sets of numbers, and sets of sets of. . . of numbers. All these operations are absolutely legitimate, but they do not require any extension of the original NN-universe, the reason being that at the first order we are still quantifying over the same entities: natural numbers (or their set-theoretic counterparts, namely 5 See for example (Sagüillo 2000) .
elements of ω).
In the specific case under scrutiny, every element in ω * is obtained by forming sets of elements in ω. This operation is absolutely legitimate, even if the elements of ω * are not elements of ω, but rather elements of (some subset of) P (ω). We can always pick out elements of our domain and form the set containing these elements. This is legitimate in arithmetic, and it is even more legitimate in the set-theoretic reduction we are carrying on. For each element in ω there will be a corresponding set of elements of ω. The introduction of ω * does not force us to modify the extension of the NN-universe, simply because the creation of this new set does not require us to quantify over elements of ω * .
In other words, at the first order we are still quantifying over elements of ω -and nothing else.
Given this conception of a NN-unverse, why should we accept ω * as part of our NN-universe? According to this conception, there is simply no reason why ω * should be included in the NN-universe. Is therefore clear that Steinhart has in mind a somehow different conception of what the NN-universe is -a conception for which NNUA plays some considerable role.
I find it quite difficult to make precise sense of which notion of "NN-universe"
Steinhart has in mind. In his view, this notion is somehow linked to the notion of "metaphysically relevant". According to the author, a metaphysically relevant condition should specify "the available existence axioms for the 'natural number universe' (the NN-universe)". In other words, "The NN-conditions specify that part of the mathematical universe to which we may ontologically reduce the natural numbers" (p. 346). Therefore, if something is metaphysically relevant for specifying what natural numbers are, then it must be included in the NNuniverse. Since, according to the author, ω * is metaphysically relevant (it seems to be included in the NN-conditions), then ω * is also part of the NN-universe.
The justification for this passage (i.e., if something is metaphysically relevant, then it must be contained in the NN-universe) is given by NNUA. Indeed, NNUA is necessary in justifying why ω * should be included in the NN-universe at all.
However, why should we accept NNUA? More specifically, the reason why the domain of a function (in this case, Q : ω → ω * ) should fall within the NNuniverse is clear (i.e., because otherwise this function would be irrelevant for the NN-universe), but there seems to be no reason why its range (ω * ) should fall within the NN-universe as well. The ranges of our functions have to be some (not necessarily proper) subset of the universe of the theory in which we carry on the reduction -and that's the only restriction we should impose over it. For we should not forget that the task we are concerned here is a reduction.
We want to reduce numbers to sets, i.e. we want to reduce the NN-universe to the universe of set theory. The reduction will be successful as long as we can accomplish this task without exceeding the limits of the set theoretical universe, but there seems to be no reason to impose any other restriction than this.
If I am right up to here, then we can only conclude that ω * must be in the set-theoretic universe, but we cannot conclude that it must be in the NNuniverse (however we conceive it). Therefore, if we cannot conclude that ω * is in the NN-universe, then neither we can conclude that α * is in the NN-universe, nor that α = α * , and the proof fails.
Of course, α * turns out to be another possible set-theoretic reduction of the natural numbers. But from this we cannot conclude that α = α * , unless we are already assuming that there is only one possible reduction -which would be a petitio principii, since this is exactly what we want to prove (more on this in sec. 4.2). The only thing we have shown, is that if α is a possible reduction for the natural numbers, then α * is another possible reduction. We can reduce the NN-universe to ω, but we can also reduce it to ω * . To put it differently, we can cut the set-theoretic universe in different ways, and we can isolate different NN-universes in it (for example, ω and ω * ); but this does not imply that ω and ω * should be part of the same NN-universe. This prevents us from concluding that α and α * are the same thing.
To sum up, Steinhart's proof necessarily requires NNUA, which in turn presupposes a 'non-standard' conception of what the NN-universe is (or should be intended). There might be reasons to accept such a non-standard conception of the notion of universe of a theory, but no such reason is offered in Steinhart's paper -and I do not see any clear reason why we should accept NNUA.
Identity and transitivity
Another crucial assumption in Steinhart's proof (and in the naïve objection as well) is that if α * is the natural numbers (as well as α), then α = α * . Again, it seems to me that the latter claim is not fully justified.
Steinhart's argument on this point looks simple and direct. If α is the natural numbers, then we can say α = N ; but if α * satisfies the NN-conditions, also α * is the natural numbers; therefore α * = N . By simply applying the transitive property of identity, α = N = α * follows, from which α = α * . The transitive property of identity seems to be quite undeniable -and it is, indeed, as far as identity is concerned. But are we sure that the relation expressed by "=" in "α = N = α * " is one of identity? What does it mean that α = N ? Or, if
you prefer, what is the proper and precise interpretation of the symbol "=" in "α = N "? And also, why can we safely say that α = N = α * ?
When Steinhart says that "if α * satisfies the NN-conditions, then α * = N ; so α = α * " (Steinhart 2002, p. 355) , he is simply saying that, since α * satisfies the NN-conditions, then we can take α * to be our natural numbers, i.e. that we can reduce natural numbers to α * . "α = N " and "α * = N " are just a way to express this in symbols. In principle, there is nothing wrong in doing this, but we should be absolutely careful not to let any surreptitious assumption to sneak in. In this particular case, by using the identity symbol to symbolize the reducibility of N to α, we are letting the transitivity (typically associated with identity) sneak in our set of assumptions. But transitivity in this context is equivalent to what we want to prove, namely that the reduction is unique (that if we have both α = N and α * = N , then α = α * ). To put it in a different way, The reducibility relation between N and α cannot be interpreted as an identity relation. Of course, the aim of any metaphysical reduction is to argue that two classes of entities are indeed the same thing (they are identical), but this is the desideratum -this is exactly what we aim to prove. In other words, that the reducibility relation is actually an identity relation should be proved. Steinhart does not offer any proof in this sense. He rather assumes that the reducibility relation is an identity relation, and then exploits the transitive property of identity to conclude that α = α * .
If I am right up to this point, the reducibility relation between α and N is not an identity relation, or -at least -we cannot assume such an identity relation until we can support it with some positive argument. Therefore, the reducibility relation between α and N cannot be expressed by the symbol "=".
As a consequence of this, the inference from "α is the natural numbers" to "α = N = α * " is blocked.
Peano Axioms and the Cardinality condition
In discussing Peano axioms, Steinhart never clarifies whether he is talking about first or second order Peano axioms. Also Benacerraf (1965) is not explicit on this point, but the standard reading is that Benacerraf's discussion is confined within first order Peano axioms. Up to this point, we implicitly assumed that Let us ignore, for the moment, the objection I previously raised about NNUA (section 4.1). Let us assume that we have a practical way to justify NNUA.
The other objection I raised (concerning identity; section 4.2) can be easily overcome if we shift to the second order. For if we are talking about second order Peano axioms, then we have categoricity: all the models of Peano axioms 12 are isomorphic; i.e., there is only one model up to isomorphisms. α = N = α * can therefore be taken to mean that α, N , and α * are all isomorphic. We assumed that α is isomorphic to N ; then we proved that also α * is isomorphic to N ; therefore, by categoricity, we can conclude that α is isomorphic to α * as well -and that is what Steinhart means when he says that α = N = α * .
According to this interpretation, what Steinhart's proof shows is that the second order NN-conditions, plus a little bit of extra structure, are enough to force FVNO as the only possible set-theoretic reduction of natural numbers.
The required extra structure is given by the way in which cardinality is defined:
if the cardinality is defined in a way that implies the formulation, for every n, of the set of all the predecessors of n, then (by categoricity) we can prove that any model of N must be isomorphic to α * , which means that FVNO is the only possible model for N .
What is interesting in this interpretation is that our second objection (section 4.2) is no longer valid. Now we have a different interpretation for the symbol "=" appearing in Steinhart's proof, namely as a symbol denoting isomorphism.
With this interpretation (and categoricity) in place, we can now legitimately deduce that α = N = α * (concerns about NNUA aside).
However, there are two problems with this interpretation. The first is that we shifted from the first to the second order. There is nothing wrong, in principle, with this manoeuvre. However, one might object to this. First of all, some logicians might have a strong interest in keeping this kind of discussions confined within the first order. As it is well known, many important results in logic only hold at the first order (the most famous one being probably the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem), and any second order version of them is either non-valid, or weaker. Others might object that, by moving to the second order, we drastically modify our set of assumptions, so that the conclusion, although still interesting, is way less relevant than before. One thing is to look for necessary and sufficient conditions that will enable us to identify what natural numbers are;
another thing is to look for these conditions once we have assumed categoricity 13 -i.e., that there is only one model (up to isomorphism) which will satisfy these conditions.
Another problem with this interpretation has to do with the way cardinality is defined. Under the interpretation of "=" offered in this section, i.e., if we take natural numbers to be FZO, then ω = ω * . The only ω in α from which we can start must be the von Neumann series, because only in this way α will turn out to be isomorphic (=) to α * -which means that α must be the FVNO. However, is this "extra structure" really necessary? Aren't there other ways to define cardinality that do not imply the formulation of the set ω * ?
In order to answer these questions, we should first understand what the cardinality condition is actually demanding. The cardinality condition is introduced by Benacerraf in the following way:
To count the members of a set is to determine the cardinality of the set. It is to establish that a particular relation C obtains between the set and one of the numbers -that is, one of the elements of N (we will restrict ourselves to counting finite sets here). Practically speaking, and in simple cases, one determines that a set has k elements by taking (sometimes metaphorically) its elements one by one as we say the numbers one by one (starting with 1 and in order of magnitude, the last number we say being k). To count the elements of some k-membered set b is to establish a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of b and the elements of N less than or equal to k. The relation "pointing-to-each-member-of-b-in-turnwhile-saying-the-numbers-up-to-and-including-k" establishes such a correspondence. 6 (Benacerraf 1965, p. 50) Later on, he recapitulates what an account of natural numbers needs:
It was necessary (1) to give definitions of "1", "number", and "successor", and "+", "×", and so forth, on the basis of which the laws of arithmetic could be derived; and (2) to explain the "extramathematical" uses of numbers, the principal one being countingthereby introducing the concept of cardinality and cardinal number. (Benacerraf 1965, p. 54) I believe what Benacerraf is suggesting here is that we should be able to offer some explanation of how we can use natural numbers to transitively count the members of any set. One way to offer this explanation, is by showing that there is a one-to-one correspondence between a k-membered set b and (what we take to be, according to how we carry on the reduction) the set of natural numbers less than k. But this is just one way to offer such an explanation, and there might be other ways to do that -ways that do not involve the reference to the set of numbers less than k. For example, let us say that we want to reduce natural numbers to the FZO. We can use the notion of "transitive closure of a set" and say that the cardinality of a set M is m iff there is a one-to-one correspondence between M and the transitive closure of the set corresponding to m − 1. 8 More in general, the cardinality condition seems to ask for an account for how we can use natural numbers to count, but it does not ask for a unique account. Our cardinality account, in other words, can be different according to the particular series of sets which we want to reduce numbers to, and the cardinality condition is satisfied as long, for any specific reduction, we can offer a cardinality account of some sort.
If we interpret the cardinality condition in this 'loose' sense, then ω * is not a necessary and indispensable part of the cardinality account anymore. But if this is correct, then the "extra structure" given by the cardinality account cannot be used to spell out other possible reductions than to FVNO. Steinhart's proof seems therefore to require a strong interpretation of the cardinality conditions -i.e., an interpretation which requires a unique cardinality account, offered in terms of a 1-1 relation between the members of a k-membered set and the set of less-than-k numbers. Here again we have an assumption which plays a crucial role in Steinhart's proof, but which lack of any justification at all.
7 A set X is transitive if the relation ∈ is transitive on it. For any set Y , we can now define its transitive closure T C(Y ) as the smallest (with respect to inclusion) transitive set which contains Y . So, e.g., the transitive closure of the set corresponding to 2 in FZO is T C({{∅}}) = {∅, {∅}, {{∅}}}, which has three elements and therefore is in a one-to-one correspondence with any set of cardinality 3. It is easy to prove, by recursivity, that for any number n, the transitive closure of the corresponding set in FZO has exactly n + 1 members.
Conclusion
In this paper, I discussed Steinhart's argument against Benacerraf's famous multiple reductions argument to the effect that numbers cannot be sets. Steinhart offers a mathematical argument according to which there is only one series of sets to which the natural numbers can be reduced (namely, the finite von Neumann ordinals), and thus attacks Benacerraf's assumption that there are multiple reductions of numbers to sets. I have shown that Steinhart's argument relies on some hidden assumptions that are not fully justified: (1) a weird and non-standard notion of NN-universe, (2) an ambiguous notion of 'identity' among possible reductions, and (3) a specific account for cardinality which is supposedly superior to other accounts. After careful examination, I offered possible reasons to reject assumptions (1)-(3), with the effect that the proof is no longer valid.
